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Ultimate values can be defined as abstract rules or
goals transcending specific contexts and defining the
utmost purposes of existence. Although the literature
about human values is vast, several fundamental
questions about ultimate values remain open. What are
the processes responsible for the formation of ultimate
values? What is the impact of inbuilt affective processes
and of learning, respectively? Regarding learning, what
is the role of society? Empirical evidence shows dra-
matic variability in ultimate values pursued by different
people. Why? These open questions suggest that a
precise picture of ultimate values is lacking. This paper
offers a computational theory of ultimate values. The
key idea is that our brain represents values along a
hierarchy where ultimate values are built upon expe-
riences with inherent affective nature (basic values).
Based on these representations, the proposal is that the
brain infers the rules that foster basic values in a variety
of contexts. These would become ultimate values and
drive human behaviour independent of the ongoing
context. We discuss how the theory can contribute to
understanding a variety of aspects of human values,
including morality, to what degree values are innate or
culturally determined, and how values shape and are
shaped by society.
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duction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited.
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1 | INTRODUCTION
When comparing different times and places, it is striking how behaviour of different people can
be driven by such diverse motives. Alexander the Great put all his energies in extending his rule
to new territories. For most of his life, Anthony of Egypt voluntarily self‐isolated in the wil-
derness of the Egyptian desert to be closer to God. The Greek thinker Socrates was deeply
dedicated to philosophical discussions as a way to unveil the truth. Martial ethos, religious zeal,
and pursuit of knowledge are three examples of ultimate values that guide human behaviour.
These can be referred to as ultimate because they embody general and abstract rules or goals,
which transcend specific contexts and define the utmost purpose of existence. As an example of
how ultimate values work, consider Alexander the Great. Putatively, his day‐to‐day behaviour
was often guided by goals such as eating, drinking, or sacrificing to gods. However, often
(though not always) we can imagine that, in the king's mind, these were not ends in themselves,
but they were instrumental to the fulfilment of the grand purpose of conquering new territory:
food and drink were consumed to be fit for battle, and gods were prayed to win their favour for
territory expansion. In this example, conquering land represents the ultimate value for Alex-
ander the Great, because it subordinates all other values. It prescribes which subordinate values
should be pursued in the different contexts (e.g., in the temple, pray the gods to win their
favour). In other words, a hierarchy is implicated here (Carver & Scheier, 1998; Pezzulo
et al., 2018; Powers, 1973; Talevich et al., 2017; Wicker et al., 1984), where ultimate values
occupy higher levels and subordinate values occupy lower levels, and where subordinate values
are constrained by ultimate values and by the current context. Although Alexander the Great,
Anthony of Egypt, and Socrates are extreme examples of dedication to ultimate values, and
most people are possibly less committed to them, yet ultimate values are arguably fundamental
also for many individuals in their personal, social, and political life (Weber, 1904/2002).
What does research tell us about the nature of ultimate values? The literature about human
values, motives, and goals is vast (e.g., Austin & Vancouver, 1996; Carver & Scheier, 1998;
Fiske, 2004; Haidt, 2001; Inglehart, 1997; Laidlaw, 2002; Maslow, 1943; Nichols, 2004; Rob-
bins, 2012; Rokeach, 1973; Schwartz, 2006, 2012); within this literature, some have highlighted
the difference between abstract and concrete values (Carver & Scheier, 1998; Powers, 1973;
Talevich et al., 2017; Wicker et al., 1984), which is critical to understand ultimate values.
However, several fundamental questions about the nature of ultimate values remain open.
What are the processes responsible for the formation of ultimate values? What is the impact of
inbuilt affective processes and of learning, respectively? And regarding learning, what is the role
of society? As the examples of Alexander the Great, Anthony of Egypt, and Socrates as well
empirical evidence show (Rokeach, 1973; Schwartz, 2006, 2012), there is a dramatic variability
in ultimate values pursued by different people. Why? These open questions suggest that a
precise picture of the nature of ultimate values is lacking. The aim of this paper is to offer a
theoretical framework to explore ultimate values, their development, the impact on motivation,
and their relationship with subordinate values. The paper is structured as follows. The next
section introduces the main tenets of the theory. To offer a precise account, this is followed by a
section where the theory is presented in the form of a computational model. Next, fundamental
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aspects of the theory are examined in detail. The paper concludes with a section where more
general issues are discussed.
2 | THEORY
According to our theory, the human brain represents different types of values along a hierarchy
(Carver & Scheier, 1998; Pezzulo et al., 2018; Powers, 1973; Talevich et al., 2017; Wicker
et al., 1984). The bottom level of the hierarchy reflects what we refer to as basic values, cor-
responding to stimuli or experiences with an in‐built affective quality. These comprise basic
physiological needs such as drinking, eating, having sex, as well as more sophisticated (but yet
inbuilt) social experiences such as sense of protection, social esteem, or social bonding. In
addition to these examples reflecting rewarding outcomes, other cases are characterised by
punishment, such as when experiencing pain, threat, social despise, or abandonment. More-
over, basic values can encompass experiences relevant for self‐interest (e.g., perception of pain)
as well as outcomes relevant for the interest of others (e.g., perception of another individual
experiencing pain), consistent with empirical evidence highlighting the importance of altruistic
considerations in shaping human motivation and behaviour (Stich et al., 2010). Altogether, our
notion of basic value is similar to the concept of unconditioned stimulus in associative learning
literature (Pavlov, 1927). Both describe outcomes able to elicit an in‐built motivational ten-
dency. This ability is viewed as largely innate (i.e., present independent of any learning), stable
(i.e., scarcely shaped by ontogenetic factors), and universal (i.e., characteristic of the whole
specie, and hence present in virtually all healthy individuals of that specie – although some
degree of inter‐individual variability is conceivable also at this level).
The second level of the hierarchy describes what we refer to as contextual values, repre-
senting stimuli or actions that initially do not have any inherent value, but that acquire it in
virtue of their ability to predict basic values in certain contexts. Again, this is inspired by
associative learning literature, and precisely by the concept of conditioned (or secondary)
reinforcer (Bell & McDevitt, 2014; Rescorla, 1980; Skinner, 1953). Empirical evidence indicates
that, if an initially neutral stimulus such as a token is associated with an unconditioned rein-
forcer such as food, then animals’ actions resulting in the token will be reinforced, even if these
actions never lead to food (Bell & McDevitt, 2014). This indicates that the token has become a
conditioned reinforcer and has acquired motivational value in it of itself (Rescorla, 1980). The
notion of conditioned reinforcer is fundamental to understand value. It highlights the enormous
learning abilities of the human brain, which is capable to go beyond evolutionary pre‐
established incentives and develop purposes specific to one own's life experience. The notion
of conditioned reinforcer is fundamental also for another reason. It emphasises the tendency of
our brain to transform experiences that are initially means (i.e., conditions useful to get some
other goals) to ends, imbued with value as such.
Following the concept of conditioned reinforcer, our theory proposes that contextual values
develop thanks to their ability to predict basic values at the level below. For example, within our
model the token and food correspond to the contextual value and the basic value, respectively.
However, our notion of contextual value, more than the notion of conditioned reinforcer,
emphasises the role of context (with analogies to literature about occasion setting; Schmajuk &
Holland, 1998). This is because our model proposes that a contextual value (e.g., a token) is such
that it predicts a basic value (e.g., food) only in specific circumstances or contexts (e.g., in the
experimental chamber) and not in others (e.g., outside the chamber). The role of context is
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critical in our formulation to distinguish contextual values from ultimate values, the latter being
independent of context and hence more abstract. Ultimate values occupy the third and top level
of the hierarchy. These are abstract goals or rules which, if pursued or applied across contexts,
foster experience of contextual values and in turn of basic values. Consider again the example of
Alexander the Great. His ultimate value, which guides Alexander's behaviour in a variety of
contexts, can be imagined to be conquering new territory. In a specific context, for example in a
newly conquered city, relying on such ultimate value implicates an appropriate contextual value
such as parading on the city's agora. This in turn implies experiencing basic values such as
perceiving admiration from the own soldiers and from inhabitants of the conquered city. In a
different context, for example in the battlefield, the same ultimate value implicates a different
contextual value such as charging the enemy, implying basic values such as experiencing
admiration from the own soldiers and observing the enemy soldiers manifesting fear.
How are ultimate values built? Our proposal is that these result from the brain's abstraction
abilities, capable of constructing hypotheses about which rules or conditions are conducive of
contextual values (and eventually basic values) across a variety of contexts (Little & McDa-
niel, 2015). Within a set of potential ultimate values, the brain would select the one which best
realises basic values; hence, in our proposal, an ultimate value is built upon basic values,
namely upon hard‐wired affective experiences. However, once selected, such ultimate value
(and note basic values) would actually drive human behaviour. Again, this stresses the brain's
propensity to transform means into ends: initially, an ultimate value is selected for its ability to
foster basic values, but, once established, behaviour would aim at realising precisely such ul-
timate value, and not the implicit basic values. For example, Alexander the Great would initially
select the ultimate value of conquering new territory because this appears to him as the best in
terms of satisfying basic values. However, once established, conquering new territory would be
pursued as an end in itself.
Note that, at first glance, our notion of ultimate value appears as similar to the notion of
generalised conditioned reinforcer (Skinner, 1953; Tan & Hackenberg, 2015), indicating a
conditioned stimulus associated with multiple kinds of unconditioned stimuli (e.g., both water
and food, and not food alone). However, the two notions are different: an ultimate value is
associated with unconditioned reinforcers (adopting associative learning terminology) across
multiple contexts, but unconditioned reinforcers can be of the same kind. Conversely, a
generalized conditioned reinforcer is associated with different kinds of unconditioned re-
inforcers, but this association can be at play only in a single context.
In short, our theory proposes that values are arranged along a hierarchy with ultimate,
contextual, and basic values occupying the top, middle, and bottom level of the hierarchy. Basic
values would correspond to experiences with a hard‐wired affective quality, contextual values to
conditions predicting basic values in specific contexts, and ultimate values to general rules
predicting contextual values (and in turn basic values) independent of context. To further clarify
the theory, the next section casts it in the form of a mathematical model.
3 | COMPUTATIONAL MODEL
The ancient historian Plutarch reports a famous anecdote about the meeting between Alexander
the Great and the cynic philosopher Diogenes, who had opted for a life of poverty, degradation,
and philosophy (Plutarch, 2004). Despite the stark distance between the two men in their way of
life, Alexander displayed a surprising admiration for Diogenes so much so that he said: “were I
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not Alexander, I would be Diogenes”. Whether true or not, for our purposes this anecdote
suggests that humans can contemplate a variety of ultimate values, and eventually select one to
be pursued. Let us imagine that, in the back of his mind, Alexander considered three alternative
ultimate values: conquest, philosophy, and conducting a luxurious life at the Macedonian court
(this latter case might not be far‐fetched too, given Alexander's reported proneness to alcohol
abuse). We will use this example to illustrate how our theory of ultimate values can be
implemented adopting computational modelling.
The model proposed corresponds to a Bayesian inference framework implemented adopting
the formalism of Bayesian networks (Bishop, 2006; Rigoli, 2021a, 2021b). The network is
described graphically in Figure 1. The circles represent categorical variables (each associated
with a set of alternative categories), reflecting beliefs entertained by an agent (e.g., by
Alexander), and arrows describe beliefs about probabilistic dependencies among these vari-
ables. The variable at the top describes Ultimate Values (UV), and includes three categories:
conquest, philosophy, and luxury; these are the three options available to Alexander regarding
the ultimate purpose of life. Each category is associated with a probability P(UV), which de-
scribes how attractive an ultimate value is a priori. The second variable is Context (C), reflecting
different conditions one expects to face in life. In our example, three of such conditions are
included: being at the royal palace, being in the battlefield, and being in the agora. Each
condition is associated with a probability P(C), describing how probable that condition is to
occur during life. The variables UV and C project to the third variable Contextual Values (CV),
reflecting the actions or outcomes to be pursued in a given context and following a given ul-
timate value. In other words, CV depends on both UV and C (formally, this dependency is
described by the conditional probability P(CV | UV, C)). For example, if UV corresponds to
conquest and C corresponds to royal palace, CV will correspond to “motivate nobles” to follow
me in battle. As another example, if UV corresponds to philosophy and C corresponds to agora,
CV will be “speak to philosophers”. The CV associated with different combinations of C and UV
is reported in Table 1 (in our example, CV can assume seven different categories). Note that, for
the sake of simplicity, in our example we assume that contingencies (described by the
F I GURE 1 Illustration of the Bayesian network describing the beliefs of an agent about value. Circles and
arrows represent variables and probabilistic dependencies, respectively. The variables are: Ultimate Values
(UV), Contextual values (CV), Context (C), and Basic values (BV)
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conditional probability P(CV | C , UV)) are deterministic: for example, when UV = “conquest”
and C = “royal palace”, the contextual value will always be CV = “motivate nobles”. More
generally, because the model is probabilistic, for each combination of C and UV one could
specify a probability attached to each category of CV.
Finally, the model includes the variable Basic Values (BV), capturing experiences with an in‐
built affective quality. For the sake of simplicity, this is represented by a dichotomous variable
where one category corresponds to reward (reflecting positive experiences) and another to
punishment (reflecting negative experiences) (Solway & Botvinick, 2012). This notion of reward
and punishment summarises all different experiences with an inherent affective nature such as
food, pain, social admiration/despise etc. Both CV and C affect BV (as described by the condi-
tional probability P(BV | C , CV)). The probability of obtaining reward given a specific C and a
specific CV (i.e., (P(BV = reward | C, CV)) indicates how good in terms of basic values a CV is in a
given context C. For example, imagine that, for Alexander the Great, P(BV = reward | C =
battlefield, CV = charge enemy) = 0.9 and that P(BV = reward | C = battlefield, CV = fly away) =
0.2. This indicates that, in the battlefield, charging the enemy is expected to be highly rewarding
(e.g., because of basic values such as admiration from other soldiers), while flying away is ex-
pected to be highly punishing (e.g., because of basic values such as shame). In our example, the
probability of obtaining reward for different CV and C is reported in Table 2. In summary, the
joint probability of the variables in the network can be expressed as follows:
PðUV ;C;CV ;BVÞ ¼ PðUVÞ PðCÞ PðCV jUV ;CÞ PðBV jCV ;CÞ ð1Þ
According to our theory, the Bayesian network can be adopted to make two types of
inference; these inferences are critical to establish the role of ultimate values in motivation and
behaviour. The first inference establishes which ultimate value among those available should be
pursued. Formally, this inference calculates the posterior probability of UV given observation of
reward (i.e., P(UV | BV = reward) (Solway & Botvinick, 2012). Intuitively, this inference asks: if
TABLE 1 Contextual value (CV) resulting from different combinations of Context (C) and Ultimate Value
(UV) in the example of Alexander the Great (see main text)
C UV CV
battlefield conquest charge enemy
battlefield philosophy fly away
battlefield luxury fly away
palace conquest motivate nobles
palace philosophy speak to philosophers
palace luxury drink alcohol
agora conquest parade
agora philosophy speak to philosophers
agora luxury court women
Notes: Formally, this indicates the category of CV with conditional probability of one for each combination of C an UV (e.g., P
(CV = charge enemy | C = battlefield, UV = conquest) = 1).
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I want to obtain reward (and consider this as given), what is the most appropriate ultimate
value? The answer to this question corresponds to a probability distribution (i.e., P(UV | BV =
reward) where each category of UV is associated with a posterior probability; the higher the
probability, the better the category for obtaining reward. Based on this, the ultimate value with
the highest posterior probability is selected, corresponding to UV∗:
UV∗ ¼ argmax
i
ðPðUV¼ i j BV ¼ rewardÞ Þ ð2Þ
This inference captures the idea that an ultimate value is selected because it is considered
the best for obtaining basic values. Once an ultimate value is selected, our proposal is that it
drives behaviour across all contexts. In our example, Alexander attributes 0.7, 0.1, and 0.2 as
posterior probability to conquest, philosophy, and luxury, respectively; hence he selects
conquest as ultimate value UV∗. Consequently, Alexander will pursue conquest in all contexts,
TABLE 2 Conditional probability of obtaining reward as basic value (BV) for different combinations of
Context (C) and Contextual Value (CV) (P(BV = reward | C, CV) in the example of Alexander the Great (see
main text)
C CV P(BV = reward | C, CV)
battlefield charge enemy 0.9
battlefield fly away 0.2
battlefield motivate nobles 0
battlefield speak to philosophers 0
battlefield drink alcohol 0
battlefield court women 0
battlefield parade 0
palace charge enemy 0
palace fly away 0
palace motivate nobles 0.4
palace speak to philosophers 0.4
palace drink alcohol 0.6
palace court women 0
palace parade 0
agora charge enemy 0
agora fly away 0
agora motivate nobles 0
agora speak to philosophers 0.5
agora drink alcohol 0
agora court women 0.3
agora parade 0.9
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including the battlefield, the palace, and the agora. Applying this ultimate value will generally
be the best option in terms of basic values, but not in all contexts: in this example, conducting a
luxury life appears as being better in the palace (because it prescribes drinking alcohol, which is
the best CV in terms of P(BV = reward | C , CV; see Table 2). Yet, Alexander will pursue
conquest also in the palace; this is because, according to our theory, the selected ultimate value
UV∗ always guides behaviour, even in contexts where it is not the best (but see below how the
model can be augmented to implement an influence of the ongoing context).
An interesting aspect emerging from the inference just described is that a measure of un-
certainty about the selected ultimate value UV∗ can be derived, corresponding to EUV jBV ,
namely the entropy of the posterior distribution P(UV | BV = reward):
EUV jBV ¼ −
X
i
PðUV ¼ ijBV ¼ rewardÞ logðPðUV ¼ ijBV ¼ rewardÞÞ ð3Þ
EUV jBV is minimal when P(UV = UV∗ | BV = reward) = 1 (implying that P(UV | BV =
reward) = 0 for other potential ultimate values), and it is maximal when P(UV | BV = reward) is
equal for all potential ultimate values. Hence, EUV jBV measures the uncertainty about the
selected ultimate value UV∗: the higher the EUV jBV , the higher the uncertainty. High uncer-
tainty means that, although an ultimate value UV∗ is selected, this is not so much better than
alternative ultimate values. We suggest that this uncertainty has implications at the motiva-
tional level, influencing the level of vigour expressed in pursuing the selected ultimate value:
lower uncertainty would result in people having higher vigour in pursuing the selected ultimate
value (Alexander the Great, Anthony of Egypt, and Socrates are arguably examples of such low
uncertainty and high vigour).
Once an ultimate value UV∗ is selected, the Bayesian network is adopted to make another
type of inference, namely to infer the posterior probability of BV = reward given the selected
ultimate value UV∗ (i.e., P(BV = reward | UV = UV∗). This estimates how good the selected
ultimate value UV∗ is in terms of obtaining basic values. If we compare the two types of in-
ferences we propose, inferring P(UV | BV = reward) is a way to compare potential ultimate
values against one another, eventually selecting one; while inferring P(BV = reward | UV =
UV∗) is a way to assess the selected ultimate value UV∗ in isolation in terms of its ability to
foster basic values. The latter inference quantifies how much a selected ultimate value UV∗ is
grounded on basic values: when P(BV = reward | UV = UV∗) approaches one, the selected
ultimate value UV∗ is strongly grounded, while when P(BV = reward | UV = UV∗) approaches
zero it is poorly grounded. We propose that this inference determines the mood associated with
pursuing the selected ultimate value. Consider religious individuals for whom the purpose of
life is suffering for expiating sins. These individuals might pursue this ultimate value vigorously
because they consider any alternative life purpose (e.g., living an hedonistic life) much worse in
terms of basic values (e.g., they expect an hedonistic life to lead to eternal suffering in hell or to
being despised by others). Yet, the mood ensuing from their ultimate value will still be rather
negative, because their ultimate value is conducive of suffering and hence of poor basic values.
In our model, such mood is captured by inferring P(BV = reward | UV = UV∗).
In sum, our model proposes that the human brain represents different types of value
organised along a hierarchy (including basic, contextual, and ultimate values), together with
their probabilistic relationship. These representations are relied upon when making two forms
of inference, the first one selecting the ultimate value to be pursued (and its associated
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uncertainty), the second one determining the ensuing mood. Note that these inferences are
proposed to occur subconsciously: in other words, phenomenologically, they would simply
result in the desire to pursue the selected ultimate value and in experiencing the ensuing mood,
without awareness that the ultimate value is in fact grounded upon basic values. While these
are the core tenets of our proposal, below we examine some further important aspects.
4 | IMPORTANT ASPECTS OF THE THEORY
Here, we examine fundamental aspects of the theory relevant for explaining the role of value in
general, and of ultimate values in particular, in human motivation and behaviour.
4.1 | Why ultimate values?
Why, in a functional perspective, should our brain identify and pursue ultimate values, rather
than simply pursuing basic or contextual values? We speculate that relying on ultimate values
might have evolved as a strategy for simplifying the choice problem. Choices are over-
whelmingly complex in ecological scenarios, because choosing optimally requires integrating a
vast amount of contextual information (Sutton & Barto, 1998). One way to simplify choice is to
identify general states or rules that lead to good outcomes across a variety of contexts, and
simply pursue these and ignore the context. This allows the brain to ignore the details of the
specific circumstances, simplifying the choice problem considerably. For example, simply
relying on the general rule “do not lie” allows one to ignore the specific context at play, hence
facilitating choice. Similarly, pursuing military conquest without assessing whether this is ad-
vantageous in each specific context, also simplifies the choice problem. Note that, if the general
rule selected is most of the time effective, then the price for following the rule and ignore the
context is not high, and it does not compensate the computational cost avoided. Essentially, our
argument is that, in a functional perspective, the human brain has evolved to pursue ultimate
values because this makes choices easier.
Why relying on ultimate values simplifies the choice problem can also be explained from
another angle. Our theory implies that, to make choice, humans perform two basic forms of
computations, occurring independently of one another (Pezzulo et al., 2018). These can be
referred to as evaluation and planning, respectively (Pezzulo et al., 2018). During evaluation
(which is the focus of this paper), the ultimate value to be pursued is identified (based on the
processes described above). During planning (which is not examined in this paper), the better
course of action for pursuing the selected ultimate value is identified. Breaking down choice in
these two processes simplifies the problem substantially, given that the interaction among the
two elements can be disregarded. In Bayesian statistics, this simplification is called factorisation
(Bishop, 2006). Factorisation is appropriate if it reflects the true environmental contingencies
(Friston & Buzsáki, 2016; Rigoli et al., 2017), in our case if it is true that (i) there are some
general states (the ultimate values) which are good across contexts, implying that contextual
information can be disregarded during planning, and that (ii) the ultimate values remain good
independent of the planned sequence of actions, implying that information about actions can be
disregarded during evaluation. Arguably, these two conditions apply to the real world, and the
brain might have evolved to exploit them and separate evaluation from planning. The idea of
factorisation in psychology is not new; for example, it has been proposed to explain the
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separation between where and what pathways in the brain (Friston & Buzsáki, 2016). Factor-
isation can be proposed to explain how the brain simplifies planning, which is the other process
underlying choice together with evaluation: abstract actions can be decomposed in operative
behaviour (Balaguer et al., 2016; Botvinick, 2012) and broken down in subgoals (Maisto
et al., 2015). Here we advocate the notion of factorisation (i) to distinguish planning from
evaluation (for a similar idea, see O'Reilly et al., 2014; Pezzulo et al., 2018), and (ii) to explain
how the brain simplifies evaluation by selecting ultimate values.
In summary, our brain might have evolved to identify and pursue ultimate, and not basic or
contextual, values because this strategy simplifies the choice problem. In a world where
planning and evaluation can be performed independently with virtually no cost, selecting ul-
timate values might be the result of evaluation processes that can be next integrated with
planning, hence simplifying the choice problem.
4.2 | How do ultimate values look like?
Our theory is flexible regarding the content of an ultimate value. A useful way to express an
ultimate value is via an imperative sentence such as (in the example above about Alexander the
Great) “conquer land”, “practice philosophy”, or “live a luxurious life”. Other examples are
“reach the top of the social hierarchy” and “follow God's commandments”. Although these are
rather abstract examples, more concrete imperatives can also become ultimate values, such as
“seek money” (Lea & Webley, 2006), “get a PhD”, “become a professional football player”, or
“have two children”. Also, sometimes ultimate values might take the form of negative state-
ments such as “do not become poor”, “do not take drugs, or “do not break the law”, with an
emphasis on states or actions to be avoided rather than to be pursued. Note that the term ul-
timate refers to the notion of abstraction (i.e., the quality of being independent of context;
Powers, 1973) and not to the notion of time. Certain states or actions appear at the end of a
behavioural chain: for example “eat the yogurt” appears at the end of the sequence “open the
door”, “open the fridge”, “take the yogurt”, “eat the yogurt”. However, “eat the yogurt” is as
abstract as all other actions; hence, according to our theory, it does not represent an ultimate
value (also, based on our distinction above between planning and evaluation, temporal chains
characterise planning and not evaluation).
Our view of ultimate values can capture processes such as morality, virtue, and well‐being.
Moral values consist in pursuing fairness, justice, or altruism during interactions with other
people (Haidt, 2001; Nichols, 2004). Within our theory, these can be casted in terms of ultimate
values. Examples of ultimate values with moral content are “be fair with other people”, “pursue
equality among people”, “follow God's commandments”, “follow the law”. Notably, ultimate
values can concern rules of conduct (e.g., “do not lie”) or states to be sought (e.g., “pursue
equality among people”), encompassing both deontological and consequentialist approaches to
morality, respectively (Crockett, 2013). Linked with morality, the notion of virtue describes
desirable personality characteristics such as honesty, compassion, and generosity
(Widlok, 2004). In our theory, virtues can also be straightforwardly cast in terms of ultimate
values, specifically as imperatives aimed at acquiring or maintaining virtue such as “be
honest”, “be compassionate”, and “be generous”. Finally, ultimate values might reflect rules or
states conducive of well‐being but not related with morality or virtue (Diener, 2009). Examples
of these are “seek money”, “indulge in pleasures such as food and drink”, “cultivate
friendship”.
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In short, our theory of ultimate values aims at being general, potentially applying to a variety
of domains including morality, virtue, and well‐being.
4.3 | Mundane concerns and contextual effects
While ultimate values reflect abstract purposes such as in religion and ideology, human
behaviour often appears as driven by what we can call mundane concerns, such as having a
good meal. Sometimes mundane concerns might be subordinate to ultimate values (e.g., in the
example of Alexander the Great, eating might sometimes have subserved the goal of being fit for
battle), but other times they are valuable as such. What is the role of mundane values in our
theory? Consider an individual addicted to alcohol whose ultimate value is to cultivate family
relationships. In certain conditions such as during abstinence (an internal cue) or when exposed
to alcohol‐related cues (external cues), the individual is overwhelmed by an attraction towards
alcohol, which endangers his ultimate value. This example highlights that, in our view, the
fundamental difference between ultimate values (e.g., cultivating family relationships) and
mundane values (e.g., alcohol) is that the former are independent of the cues one is exposed to,
while the latter are cue‐dependent. In other words, ultimate values would correspond to values
to be pursued in ideal conditions, without any cue influence, while mundane values would be
the product of cue influence. This possibility fits with empirical evidence showing that
potentially dysfunctional impulses are usually steered by internal or external cues (e.g., Dawson
& Kim, 2009).
We propose to capture the role of mundane values by adding to the Bayesian network
described above the variable contextual cue (CC), which depends on the context C (Figure 2).
Considering again the example of Alexander the Great, CC includes the same categories as C,
namely battlefield, agora, and palace. The difference is that CC describes the perceptual cues
(which can be directly observed) of each context, while C indicates an abstract representation of
F I GURE 2 Description of the Bayesian network representing the beliefs of an agent about value, now
including also the variable Contextual Cue (CC). Circles and arrows represent variables and probabilistic
dependencies, respectively. The variables are: Ultimate Values (UV), Contextual values (CV), Context (C), Basic
values (BV), and Contextual Cue (CC)
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context, which is not directly observed (i.e., it is a latent variable). Now the joint probability of
the network becomes:
PðUV ; C;CV ;BV ;CCÞ ¼ PðUVÞ PðCÞPðCCjCÞ PðCV jUV ;CÞ PðBV jCV ;CÞ ð4Þ
We propose that sometimes the ultimate value is inferred in “neutral” environments, where
no salient contextual cue is present. This consists in inferring P(UV | R = reward) and selecting
UV∗ as described by Equation (2). Other times, a contextual cue k is available; as described
below, it is during such circumstances that mundane values might overwhelm ultimate values.
When a contextual cue k is available, the posterior probability P(UV | R = reward, CC = k) is
estimated, and the selected ultimate value (now referred to as UVC) now corresponds to:
UVC ¼ argmax
i
ðPðUV ¼ i jBV ¼ reward; CC ¼ kÞÞ ð5Þ
To appreciate the implications of the contextual cue, let us consider two cases, characterised
by strong and weak cue‐influence, respectively (Table 3). Regarding strong cue‐influence, this
occurs when CC activates specific context representations C. In our example (Table 3), cues
related to the palace are particularly salient, as they strongly activate the representation of the
palace context (formally, this is reflected by the fact that P(CC = palace | C = palace) = 0.9,
which is very high; Table 3). What happens when palace‐related cues are experienced? The
selected ultimate value UVC now becomes luxury, while UV∗ (i.e., the one estimated without
any contextual cue) was conquest. The reason why now luxury is selected is because, when the
palace cue is present, drinking alcohol (associated with luxury) is particularly rewarding. This
example shows how, in our model, mundane values such as drinking alcohol can be triggered
by cues, interfering with ultimate values that would be pursued without those cues (e.g.,
TABLE 3 Conditional probability of observing a specific Contextual Cue (CCÞ given the Context C (C) (P
(CC | C )) in the example of Alexander the Great (see main text)
Strong cue‐influence Weak cue‐influence
C CC P(CC | C ) P(CC | C )
battlefield battlefield 0.6 0.34
battlefield palace 0.2 0.33
battlefield agora 0.2 0.33
palace battlefield 0.05 0.33
palace palace 0.9 0.34
palace agora 0.05 0.33
agora battlefield 0.2 0.33
agora palace 0.2 0.33
agora agora 0.6 0.34
Notes: Two different scenarios are considered: a condition of strong cue‐influence (column 3) and one of weak cue‐influence
(column 4).
12 - RIGOLI
conquering new territory). The second case describes weak cue‐influence (Table 3), evident by
the fact that cues do not activate any particular context representation. In this case, UVC and
UV∗ are equivalent, independent of the experienced cue. We propose that conditions of stronger
and weaker cue‐influence alternate during the life of everyone and that, overall, some people
might be more prone to strong cue‐influence and others to weak cue‐influence, as reflected in
one's tendency to persevere in pursuing ultimate values and ignore mundane values (Malouff
et al., 1990).
This version of the theory (where cue‐influence is implemented) not only can describe
situations where mundane values overwhelm ultimate values. It can also interpret cases where
contextual cues divert selection from one ultimate value to another; in other words, conditions
where there is a conflict not between mundane versus ultimate values, but among ultimate
values themselves. With this regard, empirical studies have shown that, depending on
contextual information, people apply different moral principles to the same dilemmas (Bartels,
2008; Greene et al., 2004; Nichols & Mallon, 2006; Palmiotti et al., 2019). A common task
adopted in these studies requires participants to decide, in fictitious scenarios, whether or not
they would kill one person in order to save the life of a group of people who would die otherwise
(e.g., Bartels, 2008; Nichols & Mallon, 2006). The assumption here is that two moral principles
compete, one deontological (“do not kill”) and the other consequentialist (“overall save as many
lives as possible”), leading to the choice of killing and of not killing, respectively. Empirical
evidence indicates that, in this task, contextual information can boost the appeal of either
principle (Bartels, 2008; Greene et al., 2004; Nichols & Mallon, 2006; Palmiotti et al., 2019). For
example, the choice of killing (reflecting the consequentialist principle) is more frequent when
the number of saved people is larger (Bartels, 2008; Nichols & Mallon, 2006). Within our theory,
this scenario can be described by a Bayesian network where the competing ultimate values
correspond to the deontological and the consequentialist principle, respectively, and where the
number of potentially saved people corresponds to the categories of the context variable C and
of the contextual cue variable CC. In the absence of any cue (i.e., with no information about the
number of people saved), an agent might select the deontological principle as ultimate value,
thus avoiding killing; this is because, in most contexts (i.e., in most cases in terms of number of
lives saved), the act of killing might be perceived as not worth enough. However, the model
implies that a cue indicating that many people can be saved might suppress the deontological
rule in favour of the consequentialist principle, leading to the choice of killing. This example
illustrates how our theory can explain the impact of contextual cues upon the appeal of
deontological versus consequentialist principles, and in general upon competing ultimate
values.
4.4 | Innate or cultural values?
To what extent are human values preprogramed by genes? And to what extent are they pro-
duced by culture? Regarding these questions, extreme positions can be found in the literature.
Some proposals maintain that, after all, humans from different times and places are driven by
the very same motives (Kenrick et al., 2010; Maslow, 1943; Shweder, 2012). Other accounts
claim that every culture develops its own idiosyncratic values which share virtually nothing
with values of other cultures (Shweder, 2012). Within this debate, our theory advocates an
intermediate position. On the one hand, ultimate values (which motivate behaviour) are
grounded on basic values characterised by an inbuilt affective quality, and hence virtually
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universal (though some degree of inter‐individual variability is conceivable) and shared by all
cultures. On the other hand, ultimate values do not correspond to basic values, but to states or
rules associated with basic values in a variety of contexts. Which specific state or rule is
associated with basic values is not pre‐established, but it depends on specific conditions such as
on the physical environment, on the technology available, and on the structure of society.
Therefore, together with universal basic values, our theory predicts a substantial variability of
ultimate values across cultures and individuals. At the same time, because formation of ultimate
values is proposed to follow certain laws, our theory implicates that, when exposed to similar
conditions (e.g., in terms of physical environment, technology available, and structure of so-
ciety), individuals will develop similar ultimate values.
Our theory suggests that the brain is predisposed to learn which states or rules (the ultimate
values) are predictive of basic values across multiple contexts. Formally, this entails learning the
parameters of the Bayesian network described above. Specifically, the brain has to learn
(i) which rules or states UV can potentially be considered, (ii) which contexts C can be expe-
rienced, (iii) which contextual values CV can be experienced, and (iv) the probability distri-
butions linking these variables together. Though a full examination of learning is beyond the
scope of this manuscript, some basic processes can be highlighted. Learning is likely to involve
direct experience with UV, C, and CV, but also social influence (Turner, 1991). The latter could
be critical for at least two reasons. First, communication with other people is arguably essential
to shape the Bayesian network: although this network describes an individual belief system, it is
likely to embody shared cultural ideas (especially those expressed by more powerful groups).
Second, social influence is likely to be a powerful basic value, for example in the form of
admiration, approval, despise, or condemnation expressed by others. Hence, we would expect
that ultimate values usually foster positive social evaluation (and avoid negative evaluation). A
key question is when learning of the Bayesian network (and of the ensuing ultimate values)
occurs during life. Although life‐long learning is a possibility, there are reasons to propose
critical periods such as childhood and adolescence. Moreover, periods of high uncertainty about
ultimate values (formally, captured by high entropy; see Equation 3) might lead to higher
openness to learning.
In summary, our theory implicates that basic values are inbuilt and universal, while ulti-
mate values depend on basic values but also on ontogenetic conditions such as physical envi-
ronment, technology available, and structure of society. Hence ultimate values are predicted to
vary across individuals and society; yet, our theory interprets this variability not as random but
as deriving from precise laws.
4.5 | Ethos
Our theory offers an interpretation of how the ethos of a society or group develops and acts. Max
Weber is perhaps the most influential thinker highlighting the central role of ethical values in
shaping society. He famously suggested that the raise of protestant ethics, viewing economic
enrichment as manifestation of God's favour, is at the root of modernity and capitalism
(Weber, 1904/2002). Weber adopted the same logic to interpret the implications of other cul-
tures, such as Confucianism and Hinduism, for the development of society (Weber, 1915/1959,
1916/2000). Weber's focus was primarily on the consequences of ethical values rather than on
how these values emerge. An influential interpretation of how ethical values arise is based on
the notion of ideology as proposed by Marx and his followers (Marx & Engels, 1845). According
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to this interpretation, the dominant class of a society is motivated by self‐interested economic
motives which require exploitation of subordinate classes. To justify self‐interest and exploi-
tation, the dominant class would develop ideologies grounded on specific ethical values. The
latter, though apparently based on morality and justice, would in fact disguise nothing more
than self‐interest and exploitation. Hence, in a Marxist perspective, ethical values do not shape
society: adopting a Marxian terminology, they are part of the superstructure, and not of the
structure, of society. They do not drive behaviour beyond the self‐interested economic motives
which underly ethical values in the first place.
What are the implications of our theory for the role of ethical values? Our theory can be
considered as an integration of some of the central ideas of Weber and Marx. Following Marx,
our theory proposes that ethical values (termed ultimate values in our account) are grounded on
basic values. We consider these basic values as largely inbuilt and universal (it is not clear
whether this was also Marx's opinion). Different from Marx, our notion of basic values does not
encompass solely economic self‐interest, but it acknowledges a variety of elements including
egoistic and altruistic aspects. Also different from Marx, in our theory ethical values are not
basic values in disguise, but they are “means” to pursue basic values in a variety of contexts that
are eventually treated as ends as such. Following Marx, in our theory people are normally
unaware of the origin of ethical values from the underlying basic values: ethical values are
viewed as simply valuable as such. This has implications for how social classes interact. For
example, members of the dominant class might embrace certain ethical values (e.g., free trade)
because these in fact support economic basic values of the dominant class. However, members
of the dominant class might be unaware of where these ethical values come from, and simply
claim them as morally just. Following Weber, our theory implicates that ethical values are
critical in shaping society, above and beyond basic values. This is because our theory proposes
that, once an ethical value has been selected, it is precisely this ethical value (and not the
underlying basic values) that drives behaviour (even in contexts where it is not conducive of
basic values). This fits with the observation that humans sometimes persist with their ethical
values despite enormous losses in terms of basic values (e.g., accepting death to foster free
trade).
In short, our theory offers an interpretation of how ethical values (referred to as ultimate
values) arise and impact on society. Combining elements from both Weber and Marx, the theory
proposes that ethical values are built upon basic values but, once established, transcend them
and become the actual forces driving behaviour.
4.6 | Ultimate values and society
In our theory, means fostering basic values in a variety of contexts are transformed into ultimate
values. Which means are actually effective in fostering basic values depends on factors such as
physical environment, technology available, and social structure. These factors vary dramati-
cally when comparing premodern and modern societies (Giddens, 2013). Premodern societies
are characterised by stability of environment, of technology, and of social structure, while
continuous change of these aspects distinguishes modern societies. Accordingly, for individuals,
the effective means for obtaining basic values (upon which ultimate values are built) remain
relatively stable in premodern society but change continuously in modern societies. Therefore,
following our theory, ultimate values will be more stable in premodern compared to modern
societies (rapidly changing ultimate values would in turn promote social change). In essence,
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this captures the classic idea that the more society changes, the more people's values change
(and the more values change, the more society changes). Moreover, modern compared to
premodern societies have higher variability in social roles (Durkheim, 1893/1997). Because each
social role (e.g., the peasant or the IT technician) implies specific effective means for obtaining
basic values (upon which ultimate values are built), modern compared to premodern societies
imply higher inter‐individual variability in ultimate values. Altogether, comparing modern
versus premodern societies, our theory predicts that ultimate values vary more both along time
and across individuals. The predicted consequence of this is that uncertainty about ultimate
values (formally EUV jBV ; see Equation 3) will usually be higher in modern versus premodern
societies. This offers an interpretation of the crisis of values often reported in association with
modernity, in conjunction with vigorous values often observed in premodern societies (e.g.,
Bendle, 2002).
Our theory also speaks to the claim, first argued by Weber, that disenchantment emerges in
modern societies. An influential theory of disenchantment is grounded on distinguishing
objective from instrumental reason (Horkheimer, 1947). Objective reason would consist in the
quest for what is truly right or wrong and would require focusing on the ends of human ex-
istence. Conversely, instrumental reason would seek to identify the most effective ways to
achieve any goal, hence focusing on means and ignoring the question of whether goals are
actually valuable. According to this perspective, modernity has witnessed a progressive shift
from objective to instrumental reason, implying that values embraced by people in premodern
societies are closer to “objective” human ends. Our theory does not share this claim. A
fundamental assumption of our theory is that the human brain is predisposed to pursue ulti-
mate values, which in a sense are means to obtain “objective” ends (corresponding to basic
values). Hence, our theory implicates a universal human predisposition for instrumental over
objective reason, that is not only characteristic of modernity. We argue that our argument is
supported when one considers ultimate values typical of premodern societies such as military
might, respect for hierarchy, and religious zeal. Whether these are closer to “objective” human
values compared to values typical of modern societies (such as scientific progress and economic
enrichment) is at least debatable.
Why have modern people abandoned values such as military might, respect for hierarchy,
and religious zeal in favour of values such as scientific progress and economic enrichment? Our
model suggests that, for a substantial number of people living in modern societies, modern
values have been simply more effective (in terms of fostering basic values) than typical pre-
modern values (other critical factors such as social influence ‐ e.g., in the form of propaganda –
are not incompatible with the theory). Does this imply that values such as scientific progress
and economic enrichment are the best ultimate values possible in a modern society? In our
theory, ultimate values are the result of constructive processes, open to imagination and
creativity. Hence, in principle ultimate values better than those available can always be
envisaged. This consideration has relevance for contemporary societies. It is useful to view the
ultimate values prevailing in these societies as limiting, and to look for alternatives with higher
potential in the context of the current environment, technology, and social structure. For
example, it has been argued that, in affluent societies where economic needs are largely ful-
filled, focusing on economic enrichment might often be a poor strategy (in terms of basic
values) compared to cultivating more “spiritual” ultimate values (e.g., Skidelsky & Skidelsky,
2012). Our theory comfortably fits with this perspective. Our theory also stresses that, to
envision better ultimate values, another key prerequisite is a realistic assessment of basic values
(namely what is inherently imbued with affect by humans).
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Finally, one last aspect is worth to be examined here. Empirical evidence highlights a
tendency for individuals to link with people who are similar to them. A factor underlying this
tendency appears to be homogeneity in values (Dehghani et al., 2016; Motyl et al., 2014): for
instance, a preference for living in communities of people sharing similar ideological and moral
values is commonly observed (Motyl et al., 2014). Our theory explains this preference as arising
because of the (realistic) belief that living with people sharing similar ultimate values fosters
realization of those values (this view is consistent with, but more general than, a previous
interpretation that morally homogeneous communities help coordinating third‐party moral
judgements; see Dehghani et al., 2016; DeScioli & Kurzban, 2009). For instance, ultimate values
in the political domain imply cooperating for building a good society, an objective which is
facilitated by living with people sharing similar values. This interpretation can also explain
exceptional cases where an individual chooses to live with people embracing radically different
values and attempts to convert these people (e.g., a religious missionary living in foreign cul-
tures). This choice still appears as motivated by realising the own ultimate values (e.g.,
spreading God's message), as these can be fostered by converting others.
In sum, our theory offers a computational perspective to study how ultimate values differ
when comparing modern and premodern societies. In addition, it offers a conceptual frame-
work to explore how novel and more fulfilling ultimate values might be envisaged in a creative
way.
4.7 | Contribution to previous literature
This section highlights the specific contribution of our proposal with respect to previous
research on human values. The notion of hierarchy is key in our account. This term is common
in research on values, though it has been used with different meanings. In some accounts,
values are ranked hierarchically based on their priority (Maslow, 1943; Wicker et al., 1984). By
applying cluster or factor analysis to investigate the similarity among people's reported values
(Rokeach, 1973; Schwartz, 2006, 2012; Talevich et al., 2017), other accounts have observed a
hierarchical structure charactesising these reports. In contrast with these approaches, our
theory adopts a notion of hierarchy based on the concept of abstraction, which considers
whether some values are more or less abstract (i.e., context‐independent) than others (Carver &
Scheier, 1998; Powers, 1973; Talevich et al., 2017; Tsushima & Burke, 1999; Wicker et al., 1984).
Perceptual control theory (Powers, 1973) has pioneered the principle that values are ar-
ranged along hierarchical structures based on abstraction. A similar idea informs identity
control theory, which focuses on how people realise salient identities in social contexts (Stets &
Burke, 2014). This theory argues that representations of identities are organized along a hier-
archy with more abstract identities occupying higher levels and more specific identities occu-
pying lower levels (Stets & Burke, 2014; Tsushima & Burke, 1999). Our theory is widely
consistent with these previous proposals. Its novel contribution (besides focusing on the more
general notion of value instead of identity; see below) consists in explaining why certain ab-
stract values (here referred to as ultimate values) are selected and pursued over alternative
abstract values. In other words, what are the processes responsible for the formation and se-
lection of ultimate values? So far, this crucial question has remained unaddressed by previous
theories (Carver & Scheier, 1998; Powers, 1973; Talevich et al., 2017; Tsushima & Burke, 1999;
Wicker et al., 1984). This issue implies important corollary questions: what is the impact of
inbuilt affective processes and of learning, respectively, in the formation of ultimate values?
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And regarding learning, what is the role of society? Why is there a dramatic variability in ul-
timate values pursued by different people? Addressing these questions represent the main
specific contribution of our theory to the literature.
Identity theory (of which identity control theory is a branch) examines why individuals
tend to embrace some identities and discard other identities (Stets & Burke, 2014). For
example, someone strongly attached to his job identity might end up working also during
weekends, when he might instead spend time with his children (and activate a paternal
identity). To explain why some identities are selected and others are discarded, the concept of
commitment has been proposed (Burke & Reitzes, 1991; Stryker, 1980): commitment to an
identity (determining a tendency to rely on the latter) would increase if the identity is asso-
ciated with (i) more benefits (e.g., money) and less costs, (ii) with more social ties, (iii) and with
social ties characterised by higher bonding. The notion of commitment partially anticipates key
ideas of our theory: the proposal that factors such as benefits and social ties determine which
identity will be activated has analogies with our proposal that basic values determine which
ultimate value will be selected. However, despite this analogy, commitment theory remains
limited with respect to the arguments developed here, for several reasons. First, it frames the
issue in terms of identity, whereas framing the issue more generally in terms of value is
arguably preferable: ultimate values can be about the self (and hence about identity; e.g., “be a
good father”), but not necessarily (e.g., “make your child rich”) (identity theory research is
recently moving towards a similar direction too, exploring the idea of moral identity; Stets &
Carter, 2012). Second, contrary to our approach, commitment theory does not apply to iden-
tities or values arranged hierarchically, and it does not clarify to what extent commitment to an
identity leads to ignoring the ongoing context. Third, the nature of the benefits supporting
commitment for an identity remains opaque, while here we rely on the notion of basic values
(linked to the well‐established notion of unconditioned stimuli). These and other shortcomings
of commitment theory prevent addressing important questions examined here, such as to what
extent ultimate values are culturally determined, and to what extent they shape behaviour
outside basic values.
5 | DISCUSSION
This paper offers a theory about the notion of ultimate value. The key idea is that our brain
represents values along a hierarchy where ultimate values are built upon experiences with
inherent affective nature (basic values). Based on these representations, the proposal is that the
brain infers the rules or states that foster basic values in a variety of contexts. These become
ultimate values and drive human behaviour independent of the ongoing context. This
perspective implicates that, when making choice, ultimate values are not given a priori, but they
are the result of an inference process. The implicit assumption is that the brain has adapted in a
way to break down choice in two processes: evaluation (resulting in the selection of ultimate
values) and planning (resulting in the selection of the appropriate chain of actions). We have
discussed how our theory can contribute to understanding a variety of aspects of human values,
including morality, to what degree values are innate or culturally determined, and how values
shape and are shaped by society.
We highlight some limitations of the theory in its current form, which can potentially be
addressed by future research. First, the theory focuses only on evaluation processes and not on
planning; though these two processes are assumed to unfold largely independently, a full
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picture requires integrating them together. Second, the current theory does not examine the
precise computations underlying the acquisition of the Bayesian network. We have stressed that
direct learning and social influence are arguably two critical factors; yet, a fine‐grained analysis
of how these and other factors (e.g., the broader role of the social structure) unfold would offer
much further insight. Third, the Bayesian network relies on a simplistic representation of basic
values, as these are described by a dichotomous variable having reward and punishment as
categories. A more sophisticated implementation of basic values, for example distinguishing the
qualitative difference among them, would be beneficial. Finally, here we have assumed that one
single ultimate value is selected, the one with higher posterior probability. However, selection
might work in a different way: for example, all ultimate values available might motivate
behaviour, each with a weight proportional to its posterior probability.
The paper offers examples of how our theory can contribute to research areas such as
morality and the study of values in society. Here, the contribution of the theory is only
sketched; an interesting avenue is to explore this in more detail. Furthermore, the theory might
potentially be relevant for other research areas where human values are critical. Two examples
are economics and clinical psychology. The standard economic approach is agnostic about the
origin of values that drive choice. However, as shown by empirical investigations highlighting
the role of religion in shaping market decisions (Iyer, 2016), understanding where values come
from is fundamental to explain economic behaviour. Our theory can contribute to shedding
light on this. Regarding clinical psychology, impairments in evaluation processes are critical in
a variety of psychopathologies such as depression, addiction, and anxiety. Our proposal of
ultimate values playing a central role in evaluation raises the question of whether, in some
forms of mental illness, formation and selection of ultimate values might be impaired. For
example, an intriguing possibility is that depression might be interpreted as a condition of
extremely high uncertainty about ultimate values (see Equation 3), with low mood deriving
from ultimate values conducive of scarce basic values (captured by inferring P(BV = reward |
UV = UV∗)).
In summary, the paper contributes to understanding the nature of human values by pro-
posing that the brain represents values along a hierarchy, with more abstract values occupying
the higher hierarchical level. These representations would be adopted by the brain to infer the
ultimate values to be pursued. The theory aims at contributing to research in a variety of
domains where human values are of critical importance.
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